Category Archives: Managerial Econ

Posts relevant to Managerial Economics.

2015 Ocean Cargo Crisis Calls for Collaboration

Interesting interview with several supply chain experts on the shipping arena.  Can suppliers play a bigger role in promoting some solutions to the dysfunction?

2015 Ocean Cargo Crisis Calls for Collaboration – Supply Chain 24/7.

Carriers and shippers definitely need to collaborate more.  This so called ‘downstream’ collaboration with shippers was highlighted by Lam and van de Voorde in a 2011 paper which analyzed how ocean carriers collaborate.  They identified collaboration with customers as the activity that did not happen. Other research has shown, as well, that the biggest payoffs occur with collaboration with customers, not with ports and other upstream partners.  Ocean carriers need to emphasize service to the real customer, the shipper.

I think that NVOCCs and other 3PL players are providing better service for shippers, as well as better information on comparative rates and routes.  That is why they are succeeding, particularly for the smaller shipper who doesn’t have much market power.  But because agency has been introduced into an otherwise direct relation, there is ‘slippage’– the 3PL or NVOCC has a motivation to give a bit suboptimal service to both carrier and shipper as it works to improve its profit.  So rates can’t be kept low; some of the surplus must be given to the agent to keep her on the ball and give the service wanted most of the time.  and there are monitoring costs, that also reduce the surplus available, which are incurred by carriers, shippers, and the NVOCC itself.

In short, information and service have their price, and it will be paid.  It will either be extracted by agents, or through competition.  In perfect competition, the surplus winds up in the hands of the factor providers.

Shifting Risk Might Be Key to Shipper – 3PL Relations

This article reflects a white paper written with the support of Adelante, a sharing site for 3PLs.

No kidding, transportation and especially 3PL contracts are the essential principal-agent problem form economics. There is plenty of moral hazard to spread around.  We see it all in transport, from shippers laying last minute conditions on truckers at the dock to 3PLs booking passage on unreliable lower cost carriers in fulfillment of a long term contract.

What’s unusual about large shippers offering contracts that ask for the 3PL to assume liabilities (risks) of certain kinds?  Nothing!  The same thing is true about manufacturers dealing with their suppliers of components, especially in the lean world of today.  It’s basic supplier relations.

The key to successful principal-agent arrangements is sharing the total surplus fairly and keeping monitoring costs low.  3PLs with great transparency to their shippers should be able to negotiate better rates. Their role as information hubs reduces transaction costs for the shipper.   In fact some 3PLs are nothing but information hubs.

To succeed in this environment, 3PLs need to excel and offer better results for their shippers than their competitors for the business.    It’s very true that the relationship will ideally be cooperative so both shippers and their 3PLs can win.  And it’s hard to get to.

Shifting Risk and Meeting in the Middle Might Be Key to Shipper & Third-Party Logistics Relations – Supply Chain 24/7.

As Interest Rates Rise, So Will Supply Chain’s Financial Stock

A brief article, but on point. Financial management is understudied and underused by supply chain practitioners.  A good opportunity for crossing an accountant with a logistician.

As Interest Rates Rise, So Will Supply Chain’s Financial Stock.