Sanctions are increasingly complex today, due to the Ukraine war. P&I Clubs are increasingly on point sorting these out for carriers and shippers.
P&I Clubs form risk pools to insure carriers on specific voyages, covering such risks as damage, war risks, and environmental damage.
The annual joint conference of the Hellenic American Chamber of Commerce included several P&I club members and attorneys who represent them and others.
I especially noted the comment by Nikolai Ivanov, of Skuld.
“being in between the sanctions authorities, and the practical part of the shipping industry…we act as a buffer between the two and have to effectively police up and down the sanctions chain”
He points out that Skuld had to deny coverage to some old customers as a result of the sanctions. His remark clarifies that the P&I clubs are on the front lines of sanctions enforcement. No one else is allocating substantial resources to it.
What can happen if this enforcement mechanism fails? The result could be a kind of free-for-all in which sanctions for the Ukraine war, for instance, are no longer of much use. There have been attempts to circumvent the major clubs, for instance, by Russia attempting to provide similar insurance. I don’t think anyone believes that Russian entities could do this on a very large scale.
It appears most of the issues are in the energy transport and bulk carrier transport areas. Extreme shortages in these areas could be the trigger for massive violations of the sanctions, possibly without insurance, with only shadow coverage, or with insurers looking the other way. This wouldn’t be a good situation.
So far the insurers have been able to cope with the sanctions increases.
With all the talk of breaking up the alliances, this decision by Maersk and MSC is smart. Each line now has a ready answer for regulators, both in the EU and the US.
The decision is reminiscent of what happened with IBM and ATT. In those cases, the US regulators sued these two giant companies on antitrust grounds. At the time, IBM was dominant in computers, and ATT was dominant in telephones, and there were concerns of price fixing with both companies. In each of these cases, the government had to take legal action against the firms. But the lawsuits dragged on and on; giant companies can easily afford large legal entourages that can string out a proceeding forever.
One of my good friends and former bosses led the IBM antitrust management team.
Somewhere in the proceedings, while imagining life after the breakup, each of these firms came to the conclusion they would be better off broken up. So each of them proposed a split-up. The proposal itself was enough to defuse the lawsuit’s consequences, and reduce concerns the regulators had.
For a short while, I worked for Lucent, which was one of the spinoffs of ATT; it was the Western Electric manufacturing division, and included Bell Labs and other electronics manufacturers. Other ATT spinoffs were the ‘baby Bells’, the regional telephone companies. Now, 40 years later, they are all gone too. So is local phone service, replaced by cell phones, so a monopoly in local landline service is not a concern. Lucent is also gone, merged into Alcatel, a large European concern with partial Chinese ownership, and is called Alcatel-Lucent. It’s a private concern.
IBM spun off its printer and PC division into Lenovo, also a Chinese company, and while they still support mainframe computing today, are now more of a software company.
I think it’s a smart move to defuse regulatory concern about alliances. The political atmosphere right now would definitely support breaking them up. Huge profits in times just past, and terrible service for customers in the past and right now make the alliances an easy political target. But saying it’s going to end anyway should buy Maersk and MSC some negotiating room with the regulators. The only issues then will be how they preserve service; these are easily dealt with by making some kind of plans that man or may not ever be implemented.
I think the big question for Maersk and MSC will be the effect on their capital expenses and on their service guarantees. The rationale for alliances was that more regular service could be offered on an alliance route because the carriers covering it would share the job of providing regular ship sailings. That would reduce the need of each firm for more ships. That’s much lower capital expense.
Alliances are a great example of business collaboration to reduce costs, here capital costs (since the voyage operating costs are ‘covered’ by the cargo). Capital is expensive; no one can buy enough ships without borrowing, or using up cash on hand, or asking for more investment.
But in recent times, carriers are blanking sailings when they don’t have full ships. Service, even on alliance routes, has deteriorated to an awful level for container shipping.
It’s hard to see how Maersk, for instance, can cover a 2M alliance route adequately for a large customer, who may require weekly shipments. Some of the business will have to go to another carrier. And then the scheduling will not be straightforward. Throw blanked sailings into the mix, and customers will suffer.
But the regulators will be appeased; they can’t regulate as much when the alliance is gone.
I think the big problem of long-term success for ocean container carriers is customer service. They have to figure out how to set delivery expectations for customers and then deliver to them reliably. Hopefully at a profit.
Another take from Drewry is posted below.\, via Nick Savvides and Loadstar.
Update 1/27/2023: another thoughtful article from Greg Miller·Wednesday, January 25, 2023 in American Shipper.
Building on the idea that maritime and rail generate less carbon than trucks, the blueprint for decarbonization suggests shifting transport to those means.
That’s easier said than done. The EU has been working hard for some years on a modal shift to river and rail transport for cargo inside Europe. They have actually had some success— a few percent improvement.
But the geography of the EU is a lot more conducive to waterborne transport of cargoes. There there are quite a few navigable rivers going inland from the coast where the ports are. Many EU ports have set up ‘inland ports’, large distribution areas inland that often can be reached by barge, to offload container cargoes and get them ready for distribution. This foresighted policy offers many advantages, both from an ESG standpoint, and for reducing congestion at the ocean ports. But the US has only one large river, the Mississippi, navigable for a long distance into the heartland, in a land mass much larger. Smaller rivers on the East Coast don’t go as far.
However, particularly on the Mississippi, there is a lot of potential for more barge traffic. I also suspect that maritime transport could be used along the coasts for some kinds of moves, particularly movements of products like refinery outputs, that might travel by truck otherwise.
So there is rail. The EU has a problem with rail; most rail is state-owned, and is oriented around passenger travel, not freight. And rail lines in Europe are not all compatible; not only are their practices disparate, but the physical equipment isn’t even compatible at some borders. That adds transfer delays as well as simple handling delays to transport. The EU will have a much harder and more costly time increasing rail cargo percentages.
In the US, we have seven Class I rail firms, all private, that crisscross the country and offer cargo service. Rail can provide the backbone of distribution from ports to the hinterland. But will it? Rail firms are all private, not public; they are currently focused on their most profitable segments, and have engaged in rampant cost-cutting. Sometimes, it’s referred to as PSR (precision scheduled railroading), but quite often it is more closely allied with old-fashioned cuts driven by short-term accounting. The recent reductions in staffing are claimed to result from PSR, but in fact, simply serve to reduce operating costs and improve operating ratios. They may result in reduced safety, as some of the claims in front of the STB put forward. And the popular step of running really long trains to save labor costs reduces flexibility and adjustability of rail traffic to support less predictable loads. These moves by private firms greatly increase the complexity of carrying out the proposed modal shift in the US.
But certainly a modal shift will reduce carbon output. And there is actually a lot that a government push could accomplish. Some of these things are:
Infrastructure improvements for inland maritime operations;
Streamlining projects for on-dock rail at ports large and small;
Inducing rail lines to improve their rail yards and lines to support a more flexible cargo mix and customer set;
Driving rail common carrier rules that will induce or force rail lines to accommodate cargoes from a broader set of customers, even though the traffic will not be as profitable as long steady coal or grain trains.
Keeping pressure on the rail lines to serve a broad base of customers, particularly intermodal (container on flat car or trailer on flat car). A move to transport this type of cargo long distances to inland container terminals would help with emissions and get trucks off the major interstates.
Supporting inland terminals and distribution points that are rail connected.
There are probably more, and Pete Buttigieg and the President’s commission on supply chain probably are thinking of them.
The biggest problem is how to get private industry and investors on board to finance and support the projects.
Supply Chain and Logistics 