The problem with 24/7 operation at ports is that no one wants to pay for it. And that is despite the fact that the costs will probably wind up being added to the import cost and passed on to the shipper and customer.
It seems port executives and supply chain players differ in their view of what’s needed. Terminals and warehouse operators and perhaps even drayage firms don’t think 24-hour service is needed to relieve the current congestion. And the staffing costs of staying open 24/7 would rise, with a lot of potential dead time. It is also hard to find additional trained staff today.
Unions are resisting because they claim the port terminals and other unionized players are not willing to hire more union workers.
And the PierPass is being taken unfair advantage of; apparently some are charging higher fees for using the time slots in the hours outside normal working times. See the second article below, which claims PierPass is only incentivizing adjustments that make them more money, rather than enhancing the flow of goods.
Is it possible for port management to get control of this? It’s doubtful under the current port governance rules.
Perhaps we need even more involvement from the federal government or the FMC to get action.
Demurrage and Detention are on everyone’s minds in ocean logistics today. The FMC proposes to regularize the information and timing of billing practices.
This could be very helpful in reducing the chaos of D&D billing today. It’s impossible to tell exactly which incidents happened when, and even who should pay. Those kinds of questions must have evidence to settle them, and it’s not being provided in bills. That results in long conversations and debates over the bills. It’s a huge time-waster, and fertile ground for complaints, refusals to pay, and legal action. These add cost while reducing consumer value.
In any principal-agent situation, when the cost of monitoring rises too much, the overall deal can’t be made. D&D charges are part of the cost of monitoring ocean trade. And in principal-agent models, monitoring costs often take the form of data collection and verification.
For years, ocean container traffic flowed fairly smoothly, and the events that triggered D&D charges did not happen very often. In those days, perhaps we could get away with settling claims by email and phone discussion. But with massive congestion worldwide, and only weak motivation to pick up empty containers, those days have changed.
We need accurate information for the parties to be able to resolve the D&D charges, and get the right bills paid by the right party. The FMC has it about right to take this first step, to regularize the bills.
Once that happens, if the D&D problem continues to be big, firms will recognize the value of investing in correct data gathering, and sharing it, and establishing standards for handling it.
John Gallagher, Washington Correspondent Monday, February 7, 2022
This article stresses the awful situation seafarers find themselves in, as a result of ships being stranded offshore unable to unload or load, and national COVID rules about flying and debarking, which prevent them from getting home when their time at sea ends. It’s a terrible situation, and countries have not done enough to make it better. International organizations such as the ILS don’t really have much influence in the face of the pandemic.
That’s not the only cost of containerization. Just like Amazon packaging, empty containers are overwhelming America’s ports, and large ports elsewhere. Countries that import more than they export are at risk of a buildup of empty containers. The original idea was that they would go back cheaply to exporting countries, kind of like HP empty printer cartridges, to be refilled and sent again, an example of a reverse supply chain.
Enter the Chinese steel industry, and Chinese nationally-backed container manufacturers. Cheap steel in China and a huge demand for containers has conspired to let these firms make new containers for just about the cost of bringing the empties back. One could argue that it’s better to use a new container because it’s less likely to have hidden damage that might affect the cargo, and that might offset the small price difference. Also eliminated is the coordination overhead of managing the shipment of empties, and then matching the empty used container with a shipper that needs it, and getting it to the loading spot.
The article also points out that the very large container ships of today have caused enormous capital investments at ports around the world. Their draft of around 50 feet meant that harbors needed to be deepened, bridges raised (New York); and their length meant that extra-long quay space is required, cutting out space for smaller barges and feeder ships (Rotterdam, Antwerp) which meant that inland transport of goods (and return of empties) could not be as efficient and timely.
The huge capital investments at ports also created winners and losers. Ports that invested reaped the benefits of increased traffic. A port is an economic engine in its neighborhood, providing jobs and business flow. Ports that did not or could not invest can no longer count on ships coming.
It’s interesting that now, in the midst of the congestion panic, a few larger shippers are forsaking the world of the megaships and alliances. They are chartering smaller container vessels themselves, buying their own containers, and seeking ports that don’t have the same level of congestion. IKEA, Amazon, Wal-mart, and others have sufficient cargo flow that they can invest in this bypass to the ocean carrier-dominated shipping scene. This could prove a boon to smaller ports who did not invest before, but who can handle the smaller ships.
It’s an old adage of operations management that a lean system will reduce batch size. In terms of our supply chains, that would mean smaller ships, more frequent sailings, and use of a wide variety of ports. And it would spread the wealth and the environmental issues shipping brings over a wider landscape.
Supply Chain and Logistics 